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1Advance-Purchase Programs:
When to Introduce and What to Inform Consumers
Abstract. We study a two-stage model in which the information processed by consumers at the ￿rst
stage (advance-purchase stage) is endogenously determined. In the model, the ￿rm decides whether
to introduce an advance-purchase program, chooses what attribute information to disclose and
determines an advance-purchase price and a retail price. Forward-looking consumers strategically
choose, based on the disclosed information, to buy in advance or to make a purchase decision
at the second stage (retail stage) when all information is revealed. We characterize the ￿rm￿ s
optimal choice on the advance-purchase program and the strategy of information disclosure. In
particular, we show that the ￿rm always prefers to introduce the advance-purchase program except
when underlying consumer preferences are extremely homogenous. In addition, we ￿nd that fully
revealing horizontal product information at the advance-purchase stage is never optimal to the ￿rm,
but revealing either partial or no product information can be optimal depending on the underlying
consumer preferences. Our ￿nding that partial information disclosure is sometimes optimal to the
￿rm is in contrast to the result in the literature of horizontal information provision that a ￿rm
maximizes pro￿t by revealing either no or full information to consumers.
Key words: advance purchase, information disclosure, dynamic pricing
JEL Classi￿cation: L12, M37.
21 Introduction
Advance-purchase programs (or pre-order programs) are widely used in the sale of future release
products such as DVDs, books, albums, software, etc. An extensive literature has studied the
condition necessary for a pro￿t advantage from an advance-purchase program under the assump-
tion that the information processed by consumers at the advance-purchase stage is taken to be
exogenous (Gale and Holmes, 1992, 1993, Dana, 1998, 1999, Xie and Shugan, 2001, M￿ller and
Watanabe, 2009, and Nocke and Peitz forthcoming). In reality, advance-purchase programs are,
however, frequently accompanied by advertising and marketing activities that may contain product
information. Thus, a ￿rm has a substantial control over what the information to reveal to con-
sumers at the advance-purchase stage. The revealed information in￿ uences consumers￿expected
valuations which in turn a⁄ect their purchase decisions. An important decision for the ￿rm, then, is
what to inform consumers. Examples of such a decision include, but not limited to, what contents
in a trailer to be displayed for a future release DVD movies, what chapters in a coming-soon book
to be excepted to show online to readers and which sample song to be played for a new album.
In this paper, we develop a simple dynamic model with an advance-purchase stage and a sub-
sequent retail stage to study the ￿rm￿ s decision to reveal product information to consumers in
the advance-purchase stage. In the model, consumers arrive (or become aware of the product) at
each stage. The ￿rm sells a product with two attributes: X and Y . We assume that Y attribute
has a larger variance in consumer expected valuation which implies that the underlying consumer
preferences are more diverse. At the advance-purchase stage, consumers initially have a same ex-
pected valuation though the ex-post realizations may di⁄er. The ￿rm decides whether to disclose
the information on certain attribute(s). In particular, the ￿rm has the options to reveal only X
attribute, only Y attribute, both or neither of the attributes. The disclosed information facilitates
consumers￿learning of their individual valuations on the revealed attribute(s). In addition, the ￿rm
decides whether to introduce an advance-purchase program and determines an associated price. At
the retail stage, the ￿rm chooses a retail price as all product information becomes available to
consumers. On the other side, consumers are forward-looking and strategically choose, based on
the disclosed information, to buy in advance or to make purchase decisions at the retail stage.
We ￿nd that the ￿rm￿ s choice of advance-purchase program and the decision to reveal product
3attribute importantly depend on the nature of the market. To facilitate analysis, we adopt a
terminology, which is similar to Johnson and Myatt (2006), to categorize four types of markets,
Mass, Large, Small and Niche market, based on the underlying consumer valuations. Generally
speaking, if consumers￿valuations for the product are relatively homogenous (heterogenous), the
￿rm will choose to serve a large (small) fraction of consumers. Thus, we label the market according
to the market size the ￿rm chooses to serve when consumers are fully informed their valuations.
We will give precise de￿nitions for each type of market in section 3.
We ￿rst provide a simple condition under which it is optimal for the ￿rm to introduce the
advance-purchase program. In particular, we ￿nd that the ￿rm always prefers to introduce the
advance-purchase program except in the Mass market in which the underlying consumer prefer-
ences are extremely homogenous. We then show that fully revealing product information under
the advance-purchase program is never optimal to the ￿rm, but revealing either partial product
information or no product information can be optimal depending on the underlying consumer pref-
erences. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium under the advance-purchase program can only
possibly be two cases: a Pooling Equilibrium in which the ￿rm discloses no information and all con-
sumers at the advance-purchase stage purchase in advance and a Separating Equilibrium in which
the ￿rm reveals the information only on X attribute and consumers with a high realized valuation
on X attribute buy at the advance-purchase stage while the remaining consumers wait and make
purchase decisions at the retail stage. Finally, we show that the Separating Equilibrium arises in
the Large market when the variance of Y attribute is su¢ ciently high while the Pooling Equilibrium
emerges in the complementary situations. The ￿rm￿ s optimal choice of advance-purchase program
and the decision on information disclosure is summarized in Table 1.
Advance-purchase program Attribute disclosed
Mass Market No None
Large Market with a high variance in Y Yes X only
Large Market with a low variance in Y Yes None
Small Market Yes None
Niche Market Yes None
Table 1
4Our paper is related to the literature on advance purchase and informative advertising. While
both are often used in practice, the existing papers only study advance-purchase program and
informative advertising in separation. The literature on advance purchase has mainly focused the
role of capacity constrain and aggregate demand uncertainty (Gale and Holmes, 1992, 1993, Dana,
1998, 1999, and Xie and Shugan, 2001). A couple of recent papers by M￿ller and Watanabe (2009)
and Nocke and Peitz (forthcoming) show that advance purchase programs can be optimal when
capacity is not a constrain or can be chosen ex-ante. In these papers, the information processed
by consumers are assumed exogenous and thus, informative advertising plays no role. In contrast,
our paper incorporates the ￿rm￿ s information disclosure decision and shows that how the ￿rm
may use informative advertising and advance purchase program complementarily to achieve pro￿t
maximization.
There is a small literature on horizontal information provision. Lewis and Sappington (1994)
and Johnson and Myatt (2006), in a similar vein, examine models in which a monopoly ￿rm
chooses the degree of preciseness of a signal on horizontal product attributes. A more precise
(or informative) signal allows consumers to have a better knowledge about how well the product
matches their preferences. Focusing on static models, the literature draws a general conclusion
that, as Bagwell (2007) notes, "the monopolist￿ s expected pro￿t often achieves its maximum at
one of the extremes, thus a pro￿t-maximizing monopolist either provides no or perfect information
about product attributes"1 Interestingly, by examining the incentive of information provision in a
dynamic model with the possibility of advance-purchase, we ￿nd that partial information disclosure
can be optimal to the ￿rm.
The rest of the papers is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a simple dynamic model
with an advance-purchase stage and a retail stage. Section 3 analyzes the model and characterizes
the ￿rm￿ s optimal strategy on the choice of the advance-purchase program and the decision of
information disclosure. Section 4 concludes.
1See Bagwell (2007), page 1784-1785.
52 The Model
A monopoly ￿rm sells a new product which has two independent attributes, X and Y . Consumers
are ex-ante identical and risk-neutral, each demands at most one unit of the product. A consumer￿ s
individual valuation is
Vi = ￿ w + Xi + Yi (1)
where ￿ w is a ￿xed amount of expected utilities derived from the product and Xi (Yi) is the con-
sumer￿ s expected utility on attribute X (Y ): As shown below, the value of Xi can be either high
(xh) with probability ￿ 2 (0;1) or low (xl) with probability 1￿￿: Similarly, the value of Yi can be
either high (yh) with probability ￿ 2 (0;1) or low (yl) with probability 1 ￿ ￿: The product can be





xh prob = ￿





yh prob = ￿
yl prob = 1 ￿ ￿
: (2)
Note that a consumer derives at least xl utility from X attribute and at least yl from Y attribute.
In other words, the only uncertainty for the consumer is xh ￿ xl in X attribute and yh ￿ yl in Y
attribute. Hence, a consumer￿ s utility function described in (1) can be normalized and written as






x prob = ￿
0 prob = 1 ￿ ￿




y prob = ￿
0 prob = 1 ￿ ￿
(4)
with w = ￿ w + xl + yl; x = xh ￿ xl > 0 and y = yh ￿ yl > 0: Without loss of generality, we
assume that x ￿ y: Table 2 displays the possible realized consumer valuations and their associated
probabilities.
6Valuations Probability
w (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
w + x ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
w + y (1 ￿ ￿)￿
w + x + y ￿￿
Table 2
In the following, we perform the analysis on the normalized framework as in (3) and (4). However,
the results should be readily applied to the more general framework as in (1) and (2).
The model has two stages: an advance-purchase stage, t = 0 and a subsequent retail stage,
t = 1. A positive measure of consumers arrive or become aware of the product at each stage. In
particular, a unit measure of consumers enter the market at t = 0 while an additional m units of
consumers arrive at t = 1. Thus, m captures the relative market size of consumers at the advance-
purchase stage to the retail stage. At the advance-purchase stage, consumers initially do not know
their valuations on neither X nor Y attribute. The ￿rm decides what attribute(s) to reveal to
consumers. In particular, the ￿rm can choose to reveal only X, only Y , both or neither of the
attributes. Consequently, consumers learn their individual valuations on the attributes that the
￿rm chooses to reveal. Accompanied with the information disclosure, the ￿rm also decides whether
to introduce an advance-purchase program and determines the associated price p0 for advance
purchase. At the retail stage, the market is populated with the consumers who arrive at t = 1
and the consumers who arrived at t = 0 but did not make advance-purchases. All information on
product attribute is assumed to be fully revealed to consumers.2 The ￿rm chooses a retail price p1
and consumers make purchase decision accordingly.
Our focus is the ￿rm￿ s strategy on information disclosure. For simplicity, we make the following
assumptions. (1) The information disclosure is costless. Thus, the ￿rm strategically chooses what
information to provide; (2) There is a positive but " small cost associated with the advance-purchase
program. By this assumption, we rule out the possibility of tie pro￿ts and avoid the complexity
2This may be due to the availability of the product on market. For instance, consumers may visit a store to
examine the product or obtain information through consumer review reports, forums, blogs or word of mouth.
7arising from mixed strategies; (3) A consumer buys the product if both purchase and no purchase
lead to a same expected payo⁄; (4) The marginal production cost is smaller than the ￿xed utility
derived from the product, that is c < w: This ensures that the ￿rm is able to make a positive
sale even if consumers are not informed any attribute information; (5) The ￿rm cannot commit to
future prices; (6) The possibility of refund and product return is not considered.
The ￿rm￿ s strategy portfolio includes Q = fAP;NAPg; S = f￿;X;Y;XY g; p0 2 R+ and
p1 2 R+ where (i) AP and NAP represent, respectively, introducing an advance-purchase program
or not; (ii) S is the set of choices on information disclosure: revealing information on neither
attribute, only X attribute, only Y attribute or both attributes; (iii) p0 and p1 are the advance-
purchase price and retail price respectively. On the other side, consumers arriving at t = 0 decide
whether to purchase in advance at the price p0, buy in the retail stage at the price p1 or exist the
market without any purchase. Consumers arriving at t = 1 only have the options of purchasing at
the retail stage or existing without a purchase.
3 Analysis
We use backward induction to solve the dynamic model. Our analysis will proceed as follows. We
￿rst provide a simple condition under which it is optimal for the ￿rm to introduce the advance-
purchase program. We then show that revealing both X and Y attribute or only Y attribute at
the advance-purchase stage is never optimal to the ￿rm. Thus, provided that the advance-purchase
program is o⁄ered, the ￿rm will only choose to reveal only X attribute or neither attribute. Finally,
we identify the condition under which revealing only X attribute and neither attribute, respectively,
is optimal.
Since consumers are fully informed about the product attributes at t = 1 it implies that the
possible consumer valuations are w; w + x; w + y and w + x + y: It follows that selling at a price
that is not equal to any of the possible consumer valuations is not a pro￿t-maximizing strategy.3
Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The optimal retail price can only be w; w + x; w + y or w + x + y.
3For example, suppose that p1 2 (w;w + x): The ￿rm then can sell to a same amount of consumers by charging
a higher price w + x and thus, earn a higher pro￿t
8We ￿rst consider the situation where the ￿rm chooses not to introduce the advance-purchase
program. Without the possibility of selling in advance, the ￿rm only determines a price at the retail
stage. By Lemma 1, the ￿rm￿ s optimal retail price pNAP
1 can be four possibilities. Accordingly, we
de￿ne the type of a market as follows.
De￿nition 1 (1) A market is de￿ned, respectively, as a Mass, Large, Small and Niche market if it
is optimal for the ￿rm to charge a retail price pNAP
1 that is equal to w; w +x;w +y and w +x+y
when consumers are fully informed about the product attributes.
Table 3 summarizes the optimal price, sales volume and the pro￿t in each type of market. From
the Mass market to the Niche market, the price charged by the ￿rm increases while the sales volume
declines.
MarketType Optimal Price sales volume Pro￿t ￿NAP
Mass pNAP
1 = w (1 + m) (1 + m)(w ￿ c)
Large pNAP
1 = w + x (1 + m)(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿) (1 + m)(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(w + x ￿ c)
Small pNAP
1 = w + y (1 + m)￿ (1 + m)￿ (w + y ￿ c)
Niche pNAP
1 = w + x + y (1 + m)￿￿ (1 + m)￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c)
Table 3
We ￿rst consider the situation where that the ￿rm chooses to introduce the advance-purchase
program. The ￿rm has multiple options on what information to reveal to consumers. In particular,
the ￿rm can choose to reveal neither, both or one of the attributes. In any case, a positive sale
has to be induced at the advance-purchase stage. Otherwise, the ￿rm would be better o⁄ by not
introducing the advance-purchase program due to a positive introduction cost. On the other hand,
consumers will purchase in advance only if they expect gaining a higher expected utility
E (Vij￿) ￿ p0 ￿ E (VijXY ) ￿ p1 (5)
or, stating di⁄erently, if the ￿rm o⁄ers a su¢ ciently low advance-purchase price
p0 ￿ p1 ￿ [E (VijXY ) ￿ E (Vij￿)] (6)
9where ￿ 2 f￿;X;Y;XY g is the consumer information set. In the following, we discuss in turn the
￿rm￿ s choice on information disclosure.
Case 1 Neither X nor Y attribute is revealed.
Provided that no information has been disclosed, consumers arriving at t = 0 have a same
expected valuation w + ￿x + ￿y. To make a positive sale at t = 0 the ￿rm has to charge a
su¢ ciently low price p0 that satis￿es (6). The equilibrium is such that the ￿rm introduces the
advance-purchase program, sells to all the consumers arriving at t = 0 for the advance-purchase
price p0 and charges the consumers arriving at t = 1 for the retail price p1. We show in the following
lemma that the advance-purchase program is always preferred except in the Mass market.
Lemma 2 Provided that neither attribute is revealed at the advance-purchase stage, the ￿rm can
always earn a higher pro￿t by introducing the advance-purchase program except in the Mass market.
Proof. If the ￿rm chooses to introduce the advance-purchase program and discloses no information,
she earns pro￿t
(p0 ￿ c)D0 + (p1 ￿ c)D1 (7)
where D0 (D1) is the number of consumers who purchase at t = 0(t = 1): Note that consumers
arriving at t = 0 are willing to purchase in advance only if
w + ￿x + ￿y ￿ p0 > ￿￿ maxfw + x + y ￿ p1;0g + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ maxfw + y ￿ p1;0g
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)maxfw + x ￿ p1;0g + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)maxfw + x ￿ p1;0g
where LHS is the expected utility from advance-purchase and RHS is the expected utility from





￿￿ maxfw + x + y ￿ p1;0g + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ maxfw + y ￿ p1;0g




We discuss the sub-cases for the Mass, Large, Small and Niche market respectively.
(i) Mass market. It follows that the optimal price at the retail stage is pAP￿￿
1 = w: From (8),
10p0 = w: Thus, the pro￿t is
￿AP￿￿ = (1 + m)(w ￿ c):
However, if the ￿rm chooses not to introduce the advance-purchase program, she obtains, from
Table 3, the same amount of pro￿t. Hence, taking into account the positive introduction cost, the
￿rm prefers to sell without the advance-purchase program.
(ii) Large market. It follows that pAP￿￿
1 = w + x: From (8), p0 = w + (￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)x: We
have
￿AP￿￿ = w + (￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)x ￿ c + m(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(w + x ￿ c)
= (￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(w + x ￿ c) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(w ￿ c) + m(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(w + x ￿ c)
> (￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(w + x ￿ c) + m(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(w + x ￿ c) = ￿NAP
where w+(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)x￿c is the pro￿t earned at the advance-purchase stage and m(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(w + x ￿ c)
is the pro￿t obtained at the retail stage.
(iii) Small market. It follows that pAP￿￿
1 = w + y: From (8), p0 = w + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿y: We
have
￿AP￿￿ = w + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿y ￿ c + m￿ (w + y ￿ c)
= ￿ (w + y ￿ c) + (1 ￿ ￿)(w + ￿x ￿ c) + m￿ (w + y ￿ c)
> ￿ (w + y ￿ c) + m￿ (w + y ￿ c) = ￿NAP:
(iv) Niche market. It follows that pAP￿￿
1 = w +x+y: From (8), p0 = w +￿x+￿y: We have
￿AP￿￿ = w + ￿x + ￿y ￿ c + m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c)
= ￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c) + (1 ￿ ￿￿)(w ￿ c) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)y + m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c)
> ￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c) + m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c) = ￿NAP:
The intuition behind the Lemma 2 is as follows. As no information is revealed at the advance-
11purchase stage, the expected valuations of consumers are kept identical. This allows the ￿rm to
capture some additional consumer surplus. However, the ability of extracting consumer surplus
depends on whether the ￿rm is able to commit to a higher retail price if consumers would not
purchase in advance. In the Mass market, the ￿rm can only commit to a retail price w if no
purchase occurs at t = 0: Consequently, the ￿rm is not able to extract any additional consumer
surplus through the advance-purchase program.
For future reference, we list the pro￿t (net of the cost associated with the advance-purchase




> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
w + mw if pAP￿￿
1 = w
w + (￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)x ￿ c + m(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(w + x ￿ c) if pAP￿￿
1 = w + x
w + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿y ￿ c + m￿ (w + y ￿ c) if pAP￿￿
1 = w + y
w + ￿x + ￿y ￿ c + m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c) if pAP￿￿
1 = w + x + y
(9)
Case 2 Both X and Y attributes are revealed.
Lemma 3 Revealing both X and Y attributes at the advance-purchase stage cannot be an optimal
strategy.
Proof. We ￿rst note that since all information is revealed at t = 0; it has to be true that p0 = p1 in
the equilibrium. We show it by contradiction. Suppose that p0 > p1: No consumers will purchase
at t = 0 since buying at t = 1 will yield a higher utility. Suppose that p0 < p1: Consumers
arriving at t = 0 with valuation below p0 will not purchase neither at t = 0 nor at t = 1: In other
words, pricing at p1 is solely based on the consumer demand at t = 1: It follows that pricing at p1
(instead of p0) at t = 0 will lead to a higher pro￿t. Therefore, we have p0 = p1 in the equilibrium.
However, the ￿rm can gain the same amount of pro￿t and save the set-up cost by not introducing
the advance-purchase program but just selling at the retail stage for a price p1: Therefore, the
strategy of revealing all information at the advance-purchase stage cannot be optimal.
Intuitively, once consumers are informed all product information at the advance-purchase stage,
the ￿rm has to charge a same advance-purchase price as the retail price p1. However, the ￿rm can
4The pro￿ts are computed in the proof of Lemma 2.
12achieve the same amount of pro￿t by selling at the same retail price p1 without the advance-
purchase program. This implies that the ￿rm gains no extra bene￿t from disclosing all information
but incurring the introduction cost of the advance-purchase program.
Case 3 Only X attribute is revealed.
In this case, consumers arriving at t = 0 are separated into two groups: consumers informed with
X = x and with X = 0. This provides an opportunity for the ￿rm to practice price discrimination.
In particular, there may exist an equilibrium such that the consumers informed with X = x at t = 0
purchase in advance at p0 while the consumers who are informed with X = 0 at t = 0 and who
arrive at t = 1 make purchase decisions under a retail price p1: In such an equilibrium, consumers
informed with X = x choose to purchase in advance only if, from (5),
w + x + ￿y ￿ p0 > ￿Maxfw + x + y ￿ p1;0g + (1 ￿ ￿)Maxfw + x ￿ p1;0g
or if the ￿rm charges the advance-purchase price
p0 < w + x + ￿y ￿ ￿Maxfw + x + y ￿ p1;0g ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Maxfw + x ￿ p1;0g: (10)
Clearly, the optimal advance-purchase price is constrained by the retail price. The following lemma
helps identify the possible retail price in equilibrium.
Lemma 4 If revealing only X attribute arises as an optimal strategy in equilibrium, the optimal
retail price charged by the ￿rm cannot be w; w + x nor w + x + y:
Proof. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium such that it is optimal for the ￿rm to charge
p1 = w +x: By (10), it implies that p0 ￿ w +x. However, if the ￿rm charges p0 ￿ w +x, she earns
at most pro￿t (not including a positive introduction cost of the advance-purchase program)
(1 + m)(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(w + x ￿ c):
The ￿rm can obtain the same amount of pro￿t by revealing neither attribute and charging a price
w+x at the retail stage. Therefore, the w+x cannot be the optimal retail price if the ￿rm reveals
13only X attribute. By a similar argument, we can rule out the possibility of w as the optimal retail
price in the equilibrium in which the ￿rm chooses to reveal only X attribute.
Suppose that the equilibrium is such that the ￿rm charges p1 = w + x + y: This implies that,
from (10), p0 = w + x + ￿y: Thus, the ￿rm earns pro￿t
￿(w + x + ￿y ￿ c) + m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c):
However, if the ￿rm introduces the advance-purchase program but reveals neither attribute, she
will optimally charge a retail price w + x + y and enjoy pro￿t, from (9)5,
w + ￿x + ￿y ￿ c + m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c)
> ￿(w + ￿y ￿ c) + ￿x + m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c)
= ￿(w + x + ￿y ￿ c) + m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c):
Therefore, w + x + y cannot be the optimal retail price if the ￿rm reveals only X attribute.
Two arguments help understand the intuition behind Lemma 4. First, if the retail price is low
(p1 = w or p1 = w+x), the ￿rm has to charge a low price (p0 ￿ p1) at t = 0 to induce consumers to
purchase in advance. In either case, consumers who purchase in advance are those whose ex-post
realized valuations are above p1:6 However, the ￿rm can manage to sell to the same consumer group
at p1 and thus, obtain at least the same pro￿t by o⁄ering a sale only at t = 1 without the advance-
purchase program: It follows that the strategy of revealing only X attribute and charging a retail
price at w or w +x is a dominated strategy. Second, if the optimal retail price is p1 = w +x+y it
implies that the market is the Niche market. The strategy of disclosing no information and charging
the advance-purchase price as w + ￿x + ￿y results the maximum possible pro￿t that the ￿rm can
possibly achieve. In fact, the ￿rm earns a lower pro￿t if she chooses to reveal only X attribute
which makes the expected consumer valuations heterogenous at the advance-purchase stage.
5The reason why the ￿rm will charge a retail price w + x + y when revealing no information is as follows. In the
case under which the ￿rm chooses to reveal only X attribute, the market demand at the retail stage consists of the
consumers who are informed with X = 0 at t = 0 and the consumers who arrive at t = 1. Thus, if it is optimal for
the ￿rm to charge a retail price as w + x + y, it should be also optimal for the ￿rm to charge the same price if the
market demand consists of only the consumers who arrive at t = 1:
6In particular, if p1 = w the ex-post valuations of all consumers are higher than p1. If p1 = w + x the ￿rm is not
able to induce the consumers whose valuation is w to purchase either in advance or at the retail stage.
14Lemma 4 implies that, if only X attribute is revealed, the possible equilibrium is that the ￿rm
charges a retail price w+y: In such an equilibrium, from (10), the ￿rm charges the advance-purchase
price w +(1 ￿ ￿)x+￿y: Consumers who arrive at t = 0 and are informed with X = x purchase in
advance and the remaining consumers (who arrive at t = 0 and are informed with X = 0 and who
arrive at t = 1) with valuation above w + y purchase at t = 1: The ￿rm earns pro￿t
￿AP￿X = ￿(w + (1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿y ￿ c) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (w + y ￿ c) + m￿ (w + y ￿ c): (11)
Case 4 Only Y attribute is revealed.
Lemma 5 Revealing only Y attribute cannot arise as an optimal strategy in equilibrium.
Proof. We show by contradiction. Suppose there exist a situation under which it is optimal for
the ￿rm to reveal only Y attribute. We can ￿rst rule out the possibility of p1 = w, p1 = w + x or
p1 = w + y by similar arguments as in Lemma 4.
Now, suppose that there is an equilibrium such that the ￿rm charges p1 = w + x + y: This
implies that, by (6), p0 = w + y + ￿x: Thus, the ￿rm earns pro￿t
￿ (w + y + ￿x ￿ c) + m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c)
= ￿ (w + ￿x ￿ c) + ￿y + m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c):
However, if the ￿rm introduces the advance-purchase program but reveals neither attribute, she
enjoys pro￿t, from (9),
w + ￿x + ￿y ￿ c + m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c)
A straightforward comparison shows that the latter strategy yields a higher pro￿t.
The arguments here are very similar to the case of revealing only X attribute. The reason why
revealing only X attribute can be a pro￿t-maximizing strategy in equilibrium while revealing only
Y attribute cannot is as follows. By revealing X attribute (with a smaller variance), the ￿rm is
able to commit to a higher future price (w + y) because a larger uncertainty in the high-variance
attribute will be revealed at t = 1: However, if only Y attribute is revealed, the only higher future
price that the ￿rm can commit to is w+x+y: As we argue, the ￿rm would rather choose to reveal
15no information which enables her to extract the maximum possible pro￿t.
We pause to summarize the results on the possible strategy and equilibrium under the advance-
purchase program.
Summary 1 Provided that the ￿rm chooses to introduce an advance-purchase program, a possible
equilibrium can be one of the two types: (1) A separating equilibrium: the ￿rm reveals only X
attribute and charges a low advance-purchase price and a high retail price; Consumers informed
with X = x purchase in advance while the remaining consumers make purchase decisions at the
retail stage when all information is fully revealed. (2) A pooling equilibrium: the ￿rm provides no
information at the advance-purchase stage and o⁄ers a discounted price such that all consumers
arriving at t = 0 purchase in advance. The ￿rm charges a higher retail price for the consumers
arriving at t = 1 who make purchase decisions accordingly.
We now are in the position to fully characterize the ￿rm￿ s strategy on the choice of advance-













￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + m)
k;
m￿









￿ (1 + m)
￿
x +
(1 ￿ ￿ + m￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 + m)
k: (13)
where k = w ￿ c:
Proposition 1 (i) It is optimal for the ￿rm to sell at the retail stage without introducing an
advance-purchase program in the Mass market; (ii) It is optimal for the ￿rm to introduce an
advance-purchase program and reveal information only on X attribute in the Large market with
y > ￿ y where ￿ y = Maxfy1;y2g; (iii) It is optimal for the ￿rm to introduce an advance-purchase
program and reveal no information on product attribute in the Large market with y < ￿ y, the Small
market or the Niche market.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the Mass market, consumer valuations are extremely homogenous. The ￿rm is lack of ability
to commit to a high retail price. In fact, it is always optimal for the ￿rm to charge w as the retail
16price. This in turn limits the possible advance-purchase price to w. Hence, the ￿rm optimally
chooses to sell only at the retail stage and save the introduction cost of the advance-purchase
program.
In the Small or Niche market, the ￿rm has no di¢ culty of committing to a high retail price
(w+y or w+x+y). Thus, the ￿rm optimally chooses to introduce the advance-purchase program.
Moreover, by revealing no information on the product attributes, the ￿rm is able to maintain
consumer expected valuations at the same level. This allows the ￿rm to extract the maximum
possible consumer surplus.
In the Large market, the ￿rm can only commit to a medium price (w + x) if she chooses not
to reveal any information. For a small increase in y (as long as in the Large market), it remains
optimal for the ￿rm to charge the same retail price and thus, from (6), the same advance-purchase
price. This implies that the ￿rm does not gain any extra pro￿t from the increase in y. However,
if the ￿rm chooses to reveal only X attribute, the separating equilibrium will arise in which the
pro￿t earned by the ￿rm DOES increase as y increases. This is because the separation of consumers
in the advance-purchase stage allows the ￿rm to commit to a higher retail price that is equal to
w+y. In such a situation, as y increases, the optimal retail price charged by the ￿rm increases. In
addition, as the retail price becomes higher, the ￿rm charges, from (10), a higher advance-purchase
price. It follows that, for a su¢ ciently large y, the pro￿t from revealing only X attribute (which
leads to a separating equilibrium) is higher than the pro￿t from revealing neither attribute (which
leads to a pooling equilibrium).
By De￿nition 1, the Mass market arises if and only if
w ￿ c > Maxf(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(w + x ￿ c); ￿ (w + y ￿ c); ￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c)g
which is equivalent to x < xo and y < yo where
xo =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿









(w ￿ c) ￿ x
￿
: (15)
17Moreover, the Large market emerges if and only if
(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(w + x ￿ c) > Maxfw ￿ c; ￿ (w + y ￿ c); ￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c)g
which is equivalent to x > ￿ x and y 2 (￿ y; ^ y) where
￿ x =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿
(w ￿ c); ￿ y = Maxfy1; y2g (16)
and





(w + x ￿ c);
￿ + ￿ ￿ 2￿￿
￿￿
(w + x ￿ c)
￿
: (17)
These lead to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (1) It is optimal for the ￿rm to sell at the retail stage without introducing an advance-
purchase program if (x;y) 2 ￿ where ￿ = (x;y) jx < xo; y < yo;: (2) It is optimal for the ￿rm
to introduce an advance-purchase program and reveal information only on X attribute if (x;y) 2 ￿
where ￿ = f(x;y) jx > ￿ x; ￿ y < y < ^ yg (3) It is optimal for the ￿rm to introduce an advance-purchase
program but reveal no information on product attribute in other cases.









m = 1;￿ = 0:5;￿ = 0:5;w = 4;c = 3
Figure 1
18Figure 1 illustrates the result in Corollary 1. The blue (light) area represents the (x; y) region in
which the ￿rm chooses to sell at the retail stage without introducing the advance-purchase program;
The purple (dark) area is the region in which the ￿rm introduces the advance-purchase program
and reveal only X attribute; The white area (the rest of the area) stands for the region in which
the ￿rm introduces the advance-purchase program and reveals neither attribute.
We next discuss how the changes in parameters a⁄ect the likelihood of the advance-purchase
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In addition, from (15), we can show that yo decreases as ￿ increases, ￿ increases, w decreases or c
increases. Therefore, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Holding other things constant, the likelihood of the advance-purchase program as an
optimal strategy increases as (i) x increases; (ii) y increases; (iii) ￿ increases, (iv) ￿ increases; (v)
w decreases; (vi) c increases (vii) but is independent with m:
We ￿nally consider the e⁄ects of changes in parameters on the likelihood of revealing X attribute
as an optimal strategy. From (12), (13) and Proposition 1, the ￿rm is more likely to reveal only X





￿2 (1 + m)
x ￿
1 ￿ ￿ + m￿
￿2 (1 + m)
(w ￿ c) < 0:
Thus, ￿ y decreases as ￿ increases. This leads to the following corollary.
19Corollary 3 In the Large market, the likelihood of revealing partial information (X attribute) as
an optimal strategy increases as (i) x decreases; (ii) y increases; or (iii) ￿ increases;
4 Conclusion
Departing from the existing literature, we have developed a two-stage dynamic model in which the
￿rm is able to in￿ uence the information processed by consumers at the advance-purchase stage. We
characterize the optimal strategy of the ￿rm on whether to introduce an advance-purchase program
and what information to disclose to consumers. We contribute to the literature on advance purchase
by incorporating the ￿rm￿ s information disclosure decision. Our ￿nding that partial information
disclosure is sometimes optimal to the ￿rm is in contrast to the well-known result in the literature
of horizontal information provision that a ￿rm maximizes pro￿t by revealing either no or full
information to consumers.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The proof consists of three parts.
Proof of (i). We have shown that, if the advance-purchase program is introduced, the ￿rm
either reveals only X attribute or no information in equilibrium. In addition, by Lemma 4, revealing
only X attribute in the Mass market is a dominated strategy and thus, cannot be an optimal
strategy.7 Furthermore, by Lemma 2, the ￿rm earns a higher pro￿t in the Mass market by selling
only at the retail stage than by introducing the advance-purchase program but with no information
disclosure.
Proof of (ii). The proof contains three steps.
7In the separating equilibrium, the demand consists of two groups of consumers: consumers who arrive at t = 0
and are informed X = 0 and who arrive at t = 1: We can show that the Mass market implies that it is optimal for
the ￿rm to charge w for each groups of consumers separately, thus the total population of the two groups.
21Step 1. We show that in the Large market with y > ￿ y; the following separating equilib-
rium exists: ￿rm reveals information only on X attribute and charges an advance-purchase price
pAP￿X
0 = w + (1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿y and a retail price pAP￿X
1 = w + y; Consumers who arrive at t = 0
and are informed with X = x purchase in advance while the remaining consumers whose realized
valuation is above p1 will purchase at the retail stage. The separating equilibrium exists because (1)
given the ￿rm￿ s strategy, consumers behave rationally; (2) given the consumers￿purchase behavior,
the prices charged by the ￿rm are optimal in the separating equilibrium.
To see (1), we note that consumers arriving at t = 0 and informed X = x will buy in advance
because the expected utility from advance-purchase, w+x+￿y ￿pAP￿X
0 ; is at least as high as the
expected utility from waiting to make purchase decision at the retail stage which is ￿(w + x + y ￿
pAP￿X
1 ): In addition, consumers arriving at t = 0 and informed with X = 0 will prefer to purchase
at the retail stage because the expected utility from purchasing in advance, w + ￿y ￿ pAP￿X
0 (a
negative utility), is lower than the expected utility from waiting to make purchase decision at the
retail stage, ￿(w + y ￿ pAP￿X
1 ):
To see (2), note that the consumer demand at t = 1 consists the consumers who arrive at t = 0
and are informed with X = 0 and the consumers who arrive at t = 1: It is optimal for the ￿rm to
charge a price w + y since, provided that y > y1;
￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + m)(w + y ￿ c)
> Maxf(1 ￿ ￿ + m)(w ￿ c); ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + m(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿))(w + x ￿ c); m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c)g
where the elements in the brackets on the RHS represent the pro￿ts for the ￿rm to charge a retail
price that is equal to w;w + y and w + x + y respectively.
Step 2. We show that the ￿rm earns a higher pro￿t by revealing X attribute than by disclosing
neither attribute in the Large market with y > ￿ y. This statement holds because, provided y > y2
22and from (11),
￿AP￿X = ￿(w + (1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿y ￿ c) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (w + y ￿ c) + m￿ (w + y ￿ c)
= (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + m￿)(w ￿ c) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿ (1 + m)y
> (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + m￿)(w ￿ c) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)x




￿ (1 + m)
￿
x +
(1 ￿ ￿ + m￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 + m)
(w ￿ c)
￿
= (1 + m(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿))(w ￿ c) + (1 + m)(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)x
= w + (￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)x ￿ c + m(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(w + x ￿ c) = ￿AP￿￿
Step 3. In the Large market, by Lemma 2, the ￿rm earns a higher pro￿t by introducing the
advance-purchase program and revealing neither attribute than by selling only at the retail stage
without introducing the advance-purchase program. From step 1-3, it follows that the optimal
strategy for the ￿rm in the Large market with y > ￿ y is to introduce the advance-purchase program
and reveal only X attribute.
Proof of (iii) We proceed as follows.
Step 1. From Lemma 2, selling only at the retail stage without the advance-purchase program
is a dominated strategy in the Large market, Small or Niche Market.
Step 2. We can show that the ￿rm can achieve a higher pro￿t by disclosing neither attribute
than by revealing only X attribute in the Large market with y < ￿ y. This directly follows from the
result in the proof of (ii).
Step 3. The ￿rm can achieve a higher pro￿t by disclosing neither attribute than by revealing
only X attribute in the Small market. Suppose that the optimal retail price is pAP￿￿
1 = w + y in
the Small market: The pro￿t from the pooling equilibrium is always higher than in the separating
equilibrium. This is because, from (9)
￿AP￿￿ = w + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿y ￿ c + m￿ (w + y ￿ c)
= ￿(w + (1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿y ￿ c) + (1 ￿ ￿)(w + ￿y ￿ c) + m￿ (w + y ￿ c)
> ￿(w + (1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿y ￿ c) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (w + y ￿ c) + m￿ (w + y ￿ c) = ￿AP￿X:
23Step 4. The ￿rm can earn a higher pro￿t by disclosing neither attribute than by revealing only
X in the Niche market. Suppose that the optimal retail price is pAP￿￿
1 = w + x + y in the Niche
market. The pro￿t from the pooling equilibrium is always higher than in the separating equilibrium
since, by (9)
￿AP￿￿ = w + ￿x + ￿y ￿ c + m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c)
> w + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿y ￿ c + m￿￿ (w + x + y ￿ c)
= ￿(w + (1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿y ￿ c) + (1 ￿ ￿)(w + ￿y ￿ c) + m￿ (w + y ￿ c)
> ￿(w + (1 ￿ ￿)x + ￿y ￿ c) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (w + y ￿ c) + m￿ (w + y ￿ c) = ￿AP￿X:
This completes the proof.
24